2026-04-13T05:49:11Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1939352025-11-20T11:06:05Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919
RECERCAT
author
Gersbach, Hans
author
Mamageishvili, Akaki
author
Tejada, Oriol
2023-02-22T15:34:13Z2023-02-22T15:34:13Z2022-11-012023-02-22T15:34:13Z
A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. We show that for a (stable) committee that uses the majority rule to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative and then to minimize aggregate information acquisition costs, its size must be small in absolute terms (if full learning is possible) and small relative to population size (if only partial learning is possible). Yet committees must never be made up of one member, so the tyranny of a single decision-maker can be avoided. Our analysis identifies both the potential and some of the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.
cc-by (c) Gersbach et al., 2022 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Operacions bancàries
Mercat monetari
Presa de decisions
Comitès
Bank transactions
Money market
Decision making
Committees
Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion