<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-17T11:54:57Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2445/187819" metadataPrefix="qdc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2445/187819</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-05T05:55:34Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_1057</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478917</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478919</setSpec></header><metadata><qdc:qualifieddc xmlns:qdc="http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dc.xsd http://purl.org/dc/terms/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dcterms.xsd http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/ http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/metadata/dcmi/xmlschema/qualifieddc.xsd">
   <dc:title>On convexity in cooperative games with externalities</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Alonso-Meijide, José Mª</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962-</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Jiménez-Losada, Andrés</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Externalitats (Economia)</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Teoria de jocs</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Optimització matemàtica</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Externalities (Economics)</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Game theory</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Cooperative games (Mathematics)</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Mathematical optimization</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2022-07-19T09:18:21Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2023-07-01T05:10:21Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2022-07-01</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2022-07-19T09:18:21Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, p. 265-292</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>(c) Springer Verlag, 2022</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:publisher>Springer Verlag</dc:publisher>
   <dc:source>Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)</dc:source>
</qdc:qualifieddc></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>