2026-04-17T06:20:08Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1878192025-12-05T05:55:34Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Alonso-Meijide, José Mª author Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel author Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962- author Jiménez-Losada, Andrés author 2022-07-19T09:18:21Z 2023-07-01T05:10:21Z 2022-07-01 2022-07-19T09:18:21Z We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities. Externalitats (Economia) Teoria de jocs Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Optimització matemàtica Externalities (Economics) Game theory Cooperative games (Mathematics) Mathematical optimization On convexity in cooperative games with externalities