2026-04-17T01:48:38Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1862902025-12-05T05:56:49Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Calleja, Pere author Llerena Garrés, Francesc author Sudhölter, Peter author 2022-06-03T08:24:07Z 2024-01-31T06:10:23Z 2021-01 2022-06-03T08:24:07Z The constrained equal welfare rule, f CE , distributes the surplus according to the uniform gains method and, hence, equalizes the welfare of the agents subsequent to the allocation process, subject to making nobody worse off. We show that f CE is the unique rule on the domain of surplus-sharing problems that satisfies efficiency, welfare monotonicity, path independence, and weak less first imposing an egalitarian bound for allowing positive payoffs to particular players. We provide an additional axiomatization employing consistency, a classical invariance property with respect to changes of the population. Finally, we show that the set of efficient solutions for cooperative TU games that support constrained welfare egalitarianism, i.e., distribute increments in the worth of the grand coalition according to f CE , is characterized by aggregate monotonicity and bounded pairwise fairness requiring that a player can only gain if his initial payoff does not exceed the initial payoff of any other player by the amount to be divided. Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Economia del benestar Igualtat Cooperative games (Mathematics) Welfare economics Equality Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems