2026-04-17T11:59:30Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1790582025-12-05T05:56:44Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919
RECERCAT
author
Van den Brink, René
author
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
author
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
2021-07-14T10:08:13Z2024-07-31T05:10:07Z2021-072021-07-14T10:08:13Z
In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability.
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Economia matemàtica
Mercat financer
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Financial market
Equilibrium (Economics)
Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion