2026-04-17T20:14:16Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1790582025-12-05T05:56:44Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Van den Brink, René author Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) author Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier author 2021-07-14T10:08:13Z 2024-07-31T05:10:07Z 2021-07 2021-07-14T10:08:13Z In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability. Economia matemàtica Mercat financer Equilibri (Economia) Mathematical economics Financial market Equilibrium (Economics) Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems