2026-04-13T13:40:56Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1790572025-12-05T05:56:41Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Castañer, Anna author Marín Solano, Jesús author Ribas Marí, Carme author 2021-07-14T09:27:43Z 2022-06-30T05:10:25Z 2021-06 2021-07-14T09:27:43Z We study cooperative solutions for differential games where players consume a common property resource. Players are asymmetric, in the sense that they have different preferences and, in particular, different time preferences. We propose a new time-consistent dynamic bargaining procedure for this class of games. This solution concept, which is de ned as the time-consistent dynamic bargaining (TCB) solution, extends the recursive Nash bargaining solution introduced in Sorger (2006) to a continuous time setting. The underlying idea is that, in case of disagreement, the threat is that players will play a noncooperative Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium just during a very small period of time, since new negotiations can take place at every future moment and, in particular, immediately later. Conditions for interior TCB solutions are derived. To illustrate the results, two common property resource games are analyzed in detail. Jocs diferencials Equilibri (Economia) Simetria (Matemàtica) Dinàmica Differential games Equilibrium (Economics) Symmetry (Mathematics) Dynamics A time consistent dynamic bargaining procedure in differential games with heterogeneous discounting