2026-04-14T02:31:39Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1598582025-11-20T11:05:53Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919
RECERCAT
author
Calleja, Pere
author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
2020-05-13T06:57:39Z2023-05-31T05:10:16Z2020-052020-05-13T06:57:39Z
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property. Remarkably, impossibility results emerge when replacing self consistency by a large set of consistency properties.
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Equitat (Dret)
Eficàcia organitzativa
Teoria de jocs
Teoria de l'estimació
Equity
Organizational effectiveness
Game theory
Estimation theory
Consistency, weak fairness and the Shapley value
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion