2026-04-14T05:04:22Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1598582025-11-20T11:05:53Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Calleja, Pere author Llerena Garrés, Francesc author 2020-05-13T06:57:39Z 2023-05-31T05:10:16Z 2020-05 2020-05-13T06:57:39Z The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property. Remarkably, impossibility results emerge when replacing self consistency by a large set of consistency properties. Equitat (Dret) Eficàcia organitzativa Teoria de jocs Teoria de l'estimació Equity Organizational effectiveness Game theory Estimation theory Consistency, weak fairness and the Shapley value