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A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets Atay, Ata Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. 2020-02-19T11:29:57Z 2022-03-31T05:10:20Z 2019-03 2020-02-19T11:29:58Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 0165-4896 https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 685281 eng Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002 Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, num. March, p. 10-14 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002 cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2019 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess 5 p. application/pdf Elsevier B.V. Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)