2026-04-14T03:37:11Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1466892025-12-05T05:57:05Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players Castañer, Anna Marín Solano, Jesús Ribas Marí, Carme Jocs diferencials Equilibri (Economia) Simetria (Matemàtica) Dinàmica Differential games Equilibrium (Economics) Symmetry (Mathematics) Dynamics We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results. 2019-12-16T11:41:41Z 2023-01-31T06:10:19Z 2020-01 2019-12-16T11:41:41Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 0167-6377 https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689 692995 eng Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.004 Operations Research Letters, 2020, vol. 48, num. 1, p. 4-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.004 cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess 5 p. application/pdf Elsevier B.V. Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)