2026-04-17T05:18:14Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1466892025-12-05T05:57:05Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Castañer, Anna author Marín Solano, Jesús author Ribas Marí, Carme author 2019-12-16T11:41:41Z 2023-01-31T06:10:19Z 2020-01 2019-12-16T11:41:41Z We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results. Jocs diferencials Equilibri (Economia) Simetria (Matemàtica) Dinàmica Differential games Equilibrium (Economics) Symmetry (Mathematics) Dynamics An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players