2026-04-14T07:45:55Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1441802025-11-20T11:05:52Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919col_2072_478940

Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points [WP] Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier Rafels, Carles Ybern, Neus Teoria de jocs Matemàtica financera Models matemàtics Assignació de recursos Game theory Business mathematics Mathematical models Resource allocation We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained. 2019-11-08T11:20:02Z 2019-11-08T11:20:02Z 2019 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/395 [WP E-Eco19/395] cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz al., 2019 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]