2026-04-17T01:45:19Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1317072025-12-06T01:56:14Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Michailidis, Gianko
author
Patxot, Concepció
2019-04-08T08:26:16Z2021-07-01T05:10:15Z20192019-04-08T08:26:17Z
Public intergenerational transfers (IGTs) may emerge from the failure of private arrangements to provide optimal economic resources for the young and old. We investigate the political sustainability of the public system of IGTs by seeking to determine the outcome if the decision to reallocate economic resources per se was put to the vote. Exploiting the particular nature of the data from the National Transfer Accounts and the political economy application of Rangel (2003), we show that most of the developed countries would vote in favor of a joint public education and pension system. Interestingly, political support is strengthened when we account for population ageing.
(c) Taylor and Francis, 2019 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Política econòmica
Envelliment de la població
Pensions
Macroeconomia
Economic policy
Population aging
Pensions
Macroeconomics
Political viability of public pensions and education. An empirical application
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion