2026-04-17T05:53:35Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1317072025-12-06T01:56:14Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Michailidis, Gianko author Patxot, Concepció author 2019-04-08T08:26:16Z 2021-07-01T05:10:15Z 2019 2019-04-08T08:26:17Z Public intergenerational transfers (IGTs) may emerge from the failure of private arrangements to provide optimal economic resources for the young and old. We investigate the political sustainability of the public system of IGTs by seeking to determine the outcome if the decision to reallocate economic resources per se was put to the vote. Exploiting the particular nature of the data from the National Transfer Accounts and the political economy application of Rangel (2003), we show that most of the developed countries would vote in favor of a joint public education and pension system. Interestingly, political support is strengthened when we account for population ageing. Política econòmica Envelliment de la població Pensions Macroeconomia Economic policy Population aging Pensions Macroeconomics Political viability of public pensions and education. An empirical application