2026-04-16T23:22:58Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1312422025-11-20T10:15:28Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Curto Grau, Marta
author
Solé Ollé, Albert
author
Sorribas, Pilar
2019-04-03T08:44:41Z2019-04-03T08:44:41Z2018-102019-04-03T08:44:43Z
We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections.
(c) American Economic Association, 2018 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Partits polítics
Eleccions
Representació proporcional
Anàlisi de regressió
Political parties
Elections
Proportional representation
Regression analysis
Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion