2026-04-13T13:08:40Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1312422025-11-20T10:15:28Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Curto Grau, Marta author Solé Ollé, Albert author Sorribas, Pilar author 2019-04-03T08:44:41Z 2019-04-03T08:44:41Z 2018-10 2019-04-03T08:44:43Z We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. Partits polítics Eleccions Representació proporcional Anàlisi de regressió Political parties Elections Proportional representation Regression analysis Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?