2026-04-14T07:38:38Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1213382025-12-04T21:20:30Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917

Popularity shocks and political selection Cavalcanti, Francisco Daniele, Gianmarco Galletta, Sergio Partits polítics Corrupció política Political parties Political corruption We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. 2018-04-06T10:51:56Z 2018-04-06T10:51:56Z 2018 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121338 eng Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions IEB Working Paper 2018/04 [WP E-IEB18/04] cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Cavalcanti et al., 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess 62 p. application/pdf Institut d’Economia de Barcelona IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers