2026-04-17T03:18:57Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1213382025-12-04T21:20:30Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Cavalcanti, Francisco
author
Daniele, Gianmarco
author
Galletta, Sergio
2018-04-06T10:51:56Z2018-04-06T10:51:56Z2018
We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media.
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Cavalcanti et al., 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Partits polítics
Corrupció política
Political parties
Political corruption
Popularity shocks and political selection
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper