<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-14T09:13:57Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2445/119349" metadataPrefix="oai_dc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2445/119349</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-05T04:22:08Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_1057</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478809</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478917</setSpec></header><metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
   <dc:title>Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Foremny, Dirk</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Política fiscal</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Dèficit públic</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Deute tributari</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Països de la Unió Europea</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Fiscal policy</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Budget deficits</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Tax debt</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>European Union countries</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy.</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2018-01-26T14:16:32Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2018-01-26T14:16:32Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2014-06</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2018-01-26T14:16:32Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>0176-2680</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119349</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>649450</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.003</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 34, num. June, p. 86-110</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.003</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>(c) Elsevier, 2014</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>25 p.</dc:format>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:publisher>Elsevier</dc:publisher>
   <dc:source>Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)</dc:source>
</oai_dc:dc></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>