2026-04-14T04:27:53Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1193492025-12-05T04:22:08Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Foremny, Dirk
2018-01-26T14:16:32Z2018-01-26T14:16:32Z2014-062018-01-26T14:16:32Z
This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy.
(c) Elsevier, 2014 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Política fiscal
Dèficit públic
Deute tributari
Països de la Unió Europea
Fiscal policy
Budget deficits
Tax debt
European Union countries
Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion