2026-04-17T18:56:44Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1193492025-12-05T04:22:08Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Foremny, Dirk author 2018-01-26T14:16:32Z 2018-01-26T14:16:32Z 2014-06 2018-01-26T14:16:32Z This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy. Política fiscal Dèficit públic Deute tributari Països de la Unió Europea Fiscal policy Budget deficits Tax debt European Union countries Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy