2026-04-13T04:13:23Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1193472025-12-05T04:23:36Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Cassette, Aurélie
author
Di Porto, Edoardo
author
Foremny, Dirk
2018-01-26T14:05:35Z2018-01-26T14:05:35Z2012-072018-01-26T14:05:35Z
This article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions. Its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments across national borders. We use panel data for the French and German municipalities in the Rhine Valley for the period 2000 2007. The local governments of each country influence firms' overall tax burdens, but the tax instruments available at the local level differ. We estimate panel models that distinguish between the effects of competing municipalities belonging to the same country and belonging to the other country. Our empirical model shows that local jurisdictions along borders choose their business tax rates based on those of their domestic neighbors and that foreign fiscal policy does not have an impact on the local domestic tax setting behavior in these contexts.
(c) Elsevier, 2012 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Política fiscal
Impostos
Competència econòmica
Impostos locals
Econometria
Anàlisi espacial (Estadística)
Federalisme
Fiscal policy
Taxation
Competition
Local taxation
Econometrics
Spatial analysis (Statistics)
Federalism
Strategic fiscal interaction across borders: Evidence from French and German local governments along the Rhine Valley
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion