2026-04-14T08:34:48Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1169712025-12-04T21:19:57Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917

urn:hdl:2445/116971 Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting Itaya, Jun-ichi Okamuraz, Makoto Yamaguchix, Chikara Relacions fiscals intergovernamentals Competència (Dret) Política fiscal Intergovernmental fiscal relations Competent authority Fiscal policy This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable. 2017-10-24T06:37:29Z 2017-10-24T06:37:29Z 2009 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions IEB Working Paper 2009/15 [WP E-IEB09/15] cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Itaya et al., 2009 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Institut d’Economia de Barcelona IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers