2026-04-18T06:11:32Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1168632025-12-04T21:19:56Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917
Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany
Egger, Peter
Koethenbuerger, Marco
Smart, Michael
Eleccions
Administració local
Dret fiscal
Federalisme
Elections
Local government
Tax law
Federalism
The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.
2017-10-20T12:37:20Z
2017-10-20T12:37:20Z
2010
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863
eng
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
IEB Working Paper 2010/44
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Egger et al., 2010
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
30 p.
application/pdf
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers