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oai:recercat.cat:2445/1168632025-12-04T21:19:56Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Egger, Peter author Koethenbuerger, Marco author Smart, Michael author 2017-10-20T12:37:20Z 2017-10-20T12:37:20Z 2010 The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives. Eleccions Administració local Dret fiscal Federalisme Elections Local government Tax law Federalism Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany