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Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects Jametti, Mario Joanis, Marcelin Descentralització administrativa Federalisme Eleccions Integració vertical Decentralization in government Federalism Elections Vertical integration This paper empirically investigates the underlying causes of expenditure decentralization, based on the predictions of a new political economy model of partial fiscal decentralization. Under shared expenditure responsibility, the degree of decentralization is endogenous and depends on the relative political conditions prevailing at each level of government. Our empirical results from a panel of democracies support the relevance of political factors as determinants of fiscal decentralization. The relationship between central government electoral strength and both expenditure and revenue centralization emerges as nontrivial and non-linear. Political forces at the central government level driving centralization up and down appear to coexist. 2017-10-16T15:23:28Z 2017-10-16T15:23:28Z 2010 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116651 eng Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions IEB Working Paper 2010/07 [WP E-IEB10/07] cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Jametti, et al., 2010 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess 39 p. application/pdf application/pdf Institut d’Economia de Barcelona IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers