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   <dc:title>The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Caruso, Raul</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Costa, Jacopo</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Ricciuti, Roberto</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Govern militar</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Dictadura</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Àfrica</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Military government</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Dictatorship</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Africa</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>In this paper we empirically analyze the socio-economic determinants of the existence of military dictatorships in Africa. A recent literature in political economy analyses the relationship between the civil undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d’état and seize  power. These papers derive three main causes of military rule: income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat. We empirically analyze these issues by estimating the probability that a country experiences a military rule. We consider 48 African countries over the period 1970-2007.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2017-10-13T11:42:58Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2017-10-13T11:42:58Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>IEB Working Paper 2011/26</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>[WP E-IEB11/26]</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Caruso et al., 2011</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:publisher>Institut d’Economia de Barcelona</dc:publisher>
   <dc:source>IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers</dc:source>
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