<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-18T07:10:51Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2445/116363" metadataPrefix="qdc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2445/116363</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-04T21:19:13Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_1057</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478859</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_478917</setSpec></header><metadata><qdc:qualifieddc xmlns:qdc="http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dc.xsd http://purl.org/dc/terms/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dcterms.xsd http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/ http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/metadata/dcmi/xmlschema/qualifieddc.xsd">
   <dc:title>Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italy</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Rizzo, Leonzio</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Zanardi, Alberto</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Eleccions locals</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Federalisme</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Impostos</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Local elections</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Federalism</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Taxation</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>We use data for all Italian municipalities, from 2001-2006, to empirically test the extent to which two electoral rules, which hold, for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single ballot plurality rule while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2017-10-09T12:47:51Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2017-10-09T12:47:51Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>IEB Working Paper 2012/33</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>[WP E-IEB12/33]</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Rizzo et al., 2012</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:publisher>Institut d’Economia de Barcelona</dc:publisher>
   <dc:source>IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers</dc:source>
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