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oai:recercat.cat:2445/1163452025-12-04T21:19:08Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain [WP-IEB] Curto Grau, Marta Solé Ollé, Albert Sorribas, Pilar Partits polítics Administració local Representació proporcional Eleccions locals Polítical parties Local government Proportional representation Local elections We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the State incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources. 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z 2012 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions IEB Working Paper 2012/31 [WP E-IEB12/31] cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Curto Grau et al., 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Institut d’Economia de Barcelona IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers