2026-04-13T03:01:07Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1163452025-12-04T21:19:08Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478859col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Curto Grau, Marta author Solé Ollé, Albert author Sorribas, Pilar author 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z 2012 We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the State incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources. Partits polítics Administració local Representació proporcional Eleccions locals Polítical parties Local government Proportional representation Local elections Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain [WP-IEB]