2026-04-13T04:11:45Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1147722025-11-20T11:01:22Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478808col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
author
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
author
Geddes, R. Richard
2017-08-30T08:45:18Z2018-08-31T22:01:23Z2017-082017-08-30T08:45:18Z
Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of different tasks. We study the factors that explain bundling in single contracts. We focus on the choice between integrating operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus vertically integrating both operational and construction tasks. We analyze a new data set that includes 553 PPPs that were concluded in the United States. We find evidence that some financial variables play a role in bundling decisions. In addition, market size and the type of economic sectors involved, are also important drivers of contract choice and bundling decisions.
(c) Springer Verlag, 2017 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Privatització
Contractació externa
Integració vertical
Estats Units d'Amèrica
Privatization
Contracting out
Vertical integration
United States
How Much Vertical Integration? Contractual Choice and Public-Private Partnerships in the United States
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion