2026-04-14T02:50:18Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1147722025-11-20T11:01:22Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478808col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Albalate, Daniel, 1980- author Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963- author Geddes, R. Richard author 2017-08-30T08:45:18Z 2018-08-31T22:01:23Z 2017-08 2017-08-30T08:45:18Z Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of different tasks. We study the factors that explain bundling in single contracts. We focus on the choice between integrating operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus vertically integrating both operational and construction tasks. We analyze a new data set that includes 553 PPPs that were concluded in the United States. We find evidence that some financial variables play a role in bundling decisions. In addition, market size and the type of economic sectors involved, are also important drivers of contract choice and bundling decisions. Privatització Contractació externa Integració vertical Estats Units d'Amèrica Privatization Contracting out Vertical integration United States How Much Vertical Integration? Contractual Choice and Public-Private Partnerships in the United States