2026-04-13T02:33:28Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1081662025-12-05T04:24:59Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
Esteller Moré, Alejandro
author
Galmarini, Umberto
author
Rizzo, Leonzio
2017-03-09T10:00:17Z2018-12-31T06:10:19Z20172017-03-09T10:00:17Z
Inter-regional redistribution through tax-base equalization transfers is examined in a setting in which taxpayers, organized as lobby groups, influence policy making. With lobbying only at the local level on tax rates, social welfare maximization implies, ceteris paribus, high (low) equalization rates on the tax bases backed by the strong (weak) lobby groups. With lobbying also at the central level, equalization is distorted downward on all tax bases if the pressure groups are similar in terms of lobbying power. It is instead distorted downward (upward) on the bases backed by strong (weak) groups if they are highly heterogeneous. In the latter situation, a uniform equalization structure may perform better than a differentiated one.
(c) Springer Verlag, 2017 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Política fiscal
Impostos
Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat)
Equitat (Dret)
Finances públiques
Fiscal policy
Taxation
Distribution (Probability theory)
Equity
Public finance
Fiscal equalization and lobbying
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion