2026-04-17T05:53:41Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1081662025-12-05T04:24:59Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Esteller Moré, Alejandro author Galmarini, Umberto author Rizzo, Leonzio author 2017-03-09T10:00:17Z 2018-12-31T06:10:19Z 2017 2017-03-09T10:00:17Z Inter-regional redistribution through tax-base equalization transfers is examined in a setting in which taxpayers, organized as lobby groups, influence policy making. With lobbying only at the local level on tax rates, social welfare maximization implies, ceteris paribus, high (low) equalization rates on the tax bases backed by the strong (weak) lobby groups. With lobbying also at the central level, equalization is distorted downward on all tax bases if the pressure groups are similar in terms of lobbying power. It is instead distorted downward (upward) on the bases backed by strong (weak) groups if they are highly heterogeneous. In the latter situation, a uniform equalization structure may perform better than a differentiated one. Política fiscal Impostos Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat) Equitat (Dret) Finances públiques Fiscal policy Taxation Distribution (Probability theory) Equity Public finance Fiscal equalization and lobbying