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   <dc:title>Orders of CM elliptic curves modulo p with at most two primes</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Iwaniec, H.</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Jiménez Urroz, Jorge</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Anàlisi matemàtica::Equacions funcionals</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Differential equations, Elliptic</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Equacions diferencials el·líptiques</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>35J Partial differential equations of elliptic type</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>Nowadays the generation of cryptosystems requires two main aspects. First&#xd;
the security, and then the size of the keys involved in the construction and&#xd;
comunication process. About the former one needs a di±cult mathematical&#xd;
assumption which ensures your system will not be broken unless a well known&#xd;
di±cult problem is solved. In this context one of the most famous assumption&#xd;
underlying a wide variety of cryptosystems is the computation of logarithms in&#xd;
¯nite ¯elds and the Di±e Hellman assumption. However it is also well known&#xd;
that elliptic curves provide good examples of representation of abelian groups&#xd;
reducing the size of keys needed to guarantee the same level of security as in&#xd;
the ¯nite ¯eld case. The ¯rst thing one needs to perform elliptic logarithms&#xd;
which are computationaly secure is to ¯x a ¯nite ¯eld, Fp, and one curve, E=Fp&#xd;
de¯ned over the ¯eld, such that jE(Fp)j has a prime factor as large as possible.&#xd;
In practice the problem of ¯nding such a pair, of curve and ¯eld, seems simple,&#xd;
just take a curve with integer coe±cients and a prime p of good reduction at&#xd;
random and see if jE(Fp)j has a big prime factor. However the theory that&#xd;
makes the previous algorithm useful is by no means obvious, neither clear or&#xd;
complete. For example it is well known that supersingular elliptic curves have&#xd;
to be avoided in the previous process since they reduce the security of any&#xd;
cryptosystem based on the Di±e Hellman assumption on the elliptic logarithm.&#xd;
But more importantly, the process will be feasible whenever the probability to&#xd;
¯nd a pair, (E; p), with a big prime factor qj jE(Fp)j is big enough. One problem&#xd;
arises naturally from the above.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>Peer Reviewed</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>Postprint (published version)</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>Article</dc:type>
   <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>Restricted access - publisher's policy</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain</dc:rights>
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