<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-05T10:48:37Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2117/11383" metadataPrefix="rdf">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2117/11383</identifier><datestamp>2026-02-07T09:11:51Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_1033</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_452950</setSpec></header><metadata><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/rdf/" xmlns:ow="http://www.ontoweb.org/ontology/1#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:ds="http://dspace.org/ds/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/rdf/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/rdf.xsd">
   <ow:Publication rdf:about="oai:recercat.cat:2117/11383">
      <dc:title>On server trust in private proxy auctions</dc:title>
      <dc:creator>Di Crescenzo, Giovanni</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Herranz Sotoca, Javier</dc:creator>
      <dc:creator>Sáez Moreno, Germán</dc:creator>
      <dc:subject>Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Seguretat informàtica::Criptografia</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Auctions -- Computer network resources</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Proxy auctions</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Subhastes electròniques</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Probes de coneixement zero</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Confiança en servidor</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Criptografia</dc:subject>
      <dc:subject>Seguretat de les comunicacions</dc:subject>
      <dc:description>We investigate proxy auctions, an auction model which is proving very successful for on-line businesses (e.g.http://www.ebay.com), where a trusted server manages bids from clients by continuously updating the current price of the item and the currently winning bid as well as keeping private the winning client’s maximum bid.&#xd;
We propose techniques for reducing the trust in the server by defining and achieving&#xd;
a security property, called server integrity. Informally, this property protects&#xd;
clients from a novel and large class of attacks from a corrupted server by allowing&#xd;
them to verify the correctness of updates to the current price and the currently&#xd;
winning bid. Our new auction scheme achieves server integrity and satisfies two important&#xd;
properties that are not enjoyed by previous work in the literature: it has minimal&#xd;
interaction, and only requires a single trusted server. The main ingredients of&#xd;
our scheme are two minimal-round implementations of zero-knowledge proofs for&#xd;
proving lower bounds on encrypted values: one based on discrete logarithms that is&#xd;
more efficient but uses the random oracle assumption, and another based on quadratic&#xd;
residuosity that only uses standard intractability assumptions but is less efficient.</dc:description>
      <dc:description>Postprint (published version)</dc:description>
      <dc:date>2010-10-09</dc:date>
      <dc:type>Article</dc:type>
      <dc:relation>http://www.springerlink.com/content/w86265685781xw37/about/</dc:relation>
      <dc:rights>Restricted access - publisher's policy</dc:rights>
   </ow:Publication>
</rdf:RDF></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>