2026-04-14T02:23:10Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2072/4736462025-07-29T22:36:33Zcom_2072_98col_2072_378192

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness Arribillaga, R. Pablo Massó, Jordi Neme, Alejandro Obvious strategy-proofness Generalized median voters Single-peakedness Altres ajuts: UNSL (032016) ; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) (PIP 112-201501-005055) ; Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT 2017-2355) We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies. 2020 Article Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-711 Journal of economic theory ; Vol. 186 (2020), p. 104992 open access Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/