<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-14T07:29:16Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2072/473646" metadataPrefix="oai_dc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2072/473646</identifier><datestamp>2025-07-29T22:36:33Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_98</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_378192</setSpec></header><metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
   <dc:title>On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Arribillaga, R. Pablo</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Massó, Jordi</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Neme, Alejandro</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Obvious strategy-proofness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Generalized median voters</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Single-peakedness</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>Altres ajuts: UNSL (032016) ; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) (PIP 112-201501-005055) ; Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT 2017-2355)</dc:description>
   <dc:description>We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2020</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Article</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288851</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:10.1016/j.jet.2020.104992</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:288851</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:pure_id:273818457</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:scopus_id:85078002991</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:articleid:10957235v186p104992</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/f6ea31e3-3393-4226-ad94-267a4870efaa</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2017-83534-P</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017/SGR-711</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Journal of economic theory ; Vol. 186 (2020), p. 104992</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>open access</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:publisher/>
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