2026-04-13T01:21:05Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request
oai:recercat.cat:2072/4736462025-07-29T22:36:33Zcom_2072_98col_2072_378192
RECERCAT author Arribillaga, R. Pablo author Massó, Jordi author Neme, Alejandro 2020 Altres ajuts: UNSL (032016) ; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) (PIP 112-201501-005055) ; Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT 2017-2355)We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies. open access Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Obvious strategy-proofness Generalized median voters Single-peakedness On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness Article