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On Cost Sharing in the Provision of a Binaryand Excludable Public Good Massó, Jordi Nicolò, Antonio Sen, Arunava Sharma, Tridib Ütkü, Levent We study the efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, equal cost sharing is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-budgetde cit mechanisms only when there are 2 agents. In general the equal cost sharing mechanism is no longer optimal in this class: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of equal cost sharing with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, equal cost sharing mechanism regains optimality. 2014 Working paper open access Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets. https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/