<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-17T17:27:03Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:2072/453597" metadataPrefix="oai_dc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:2072/453597</identifier><datestamp>2025-07-22T19:04:28Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_98</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_378197</setSpec></header><metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
   <dc:title>On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Chatterji, Shurojit</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Massó, Jordi</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Strategy-proofness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Single-peakedness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Anonymity</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Unanimity</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Tops-onlyness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Semilattice</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>Altres ajuts: Singapore Management University, mitjançant subvenció C244/MSS13E001</dc:description>
   <dc:description>We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference pro les. We show that if the social choice function satis es in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be de ned. We also provide a converse of this main nding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2015</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Working paper</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>https://ddd.uab.cat/record/296701</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:296701</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/3ff3e1df-2a3f-46ac-bb3b-c256944943b2</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>urn:pure_id:430622689</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2011-0075</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2008-0475</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014/SGR-515</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers ; 2015</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>open access</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:publisher>Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics;</dc:publisher>
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