2026-04-13T05:51:43Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2072/4250322025-09-12T18:42:02Zcom_2072_98col_2072_378197

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Klaus, Bettina author Klijn, Flip author Walzl, Markus author Harvard Business School author 2010 Altres ajuts: VIDI-452-06-013 Altres ajuts: CONSOLIDER-INGENIO/CSD2006-00016 In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else. Housing markets Indivisible goods Farsightedness Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets Top trading cycles Competitive allocations Farsighted house allocation