2026-04-14T03:08:57Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2072/4248812025-02-06T19:57:19Zcom_2072_98col_2072_378197

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Bonifacio, Agustín G. author Massó, Jordi author Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica author Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica author 2019 Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502 We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. Strategy-proofness Unanimity Anonymity Tops-onlyness Single-peakedness On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness