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                  <mods:namePart>Chong, H. Gin</mods:namePart>
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               <mods:name>
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                  <mods:namePart>Laitinen, Erkki K.</mods:namePart>
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               <mods:name>
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                  <mods:namePart>Myllymäki, Emma-Riikka</mods:namePart>
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               <mods:name>
                  <mods:role>
                     <mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm>
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                  <mods:namePart>Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Empresa</mods:namePart>
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               <mods:originInfo>
                  <mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8601">2014</mods:dateIssued>
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               <mods:identifier type="none"/>
               <mods:abstract>This study investigates whether incumbent audit firm-provided tax services enhance or impair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies' low financial reporting quality. In particular, we examine the association between tax-related fees and the likelihood of timely restatements, and internal control weakness disclosures among a sample of US companies that all have misstatements in financial information. The empirical findings indicate that companies paying higher tax-related fees are less likely to disclose SOX 404 internal control weakness disclosures, implying that underlying control problems are unacknowledged when incumbent audit firm provided tax-related fees are higher. However, the findings suggest that just providing both audit and tax-related services does not have an impact on audit quality per se, but rather it is the magnitude of the tax-related fees in particular that counts. We also find some evidence suggesting that companies paying higher tax-related fees have higher likelihood of restatement lags, whereas companies paying smaller tax-related fees to their audit firm restate financial statements in a timelier manner. Overall, the findings suggest that audit scrutiny of client companies with low quality financial reporting is weaker when the magnitude of tax-related fees is higher.</mods:abstract>
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               <mods:accessCondition type="useAndReproduction">open access Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/</mods:accessCondition>
               <mods:subject>
                  <mods:topic>Auditoria</mods:topic>
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               <mods:subject>
                  <mods:topic>Impostos</mods:topic>
               </mods:subject>
               <mods:subject>
                  <mods:topic>Informació financera</mods:topic>
               </mods:subject>
               <mods:titleInfo>
                  <mods:title>Incumbent audit firm-provided tax services and the clients with low financial reporting quality</mods:title>
               </mods:titleInfo>
               <mods:genre>Working paper</mods:genre>
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