2026-04-13T04:52:44Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2072/4235432024-10-29T15:30:40Zcom_2072_98col_2072_378197

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús author Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica author Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica author 2008 Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ. Emigració i immigració Política governamental Emigració i immigració A General model of bilateral migration agreements