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   <dc:title>Environmental regulation : choice of instruments under imperfect compliance</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Macho Stadler, Inés</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Política del medi ambient</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Environmental regulation</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Audits and compliance</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Environmental instruments</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>This paper originated from the AEE/REE presidential address for the XXX Simposio de Análisis Económico (Murcia 2005). It builds on the research project on optimal enforcement in environmental problems done in collaboration with David Pérez-Castrillo. I would like to thank David Pérez-Castrillo and Pau Olivella for their useful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (BEC2003-01132) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Barcelona Economics - CREA and 2005SGR-00836).</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2007</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>Working paper</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2005/SGR-00836</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación BEC2003-01132</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>Spanish economic review ; Vol. 10, Num. 1 (2008), p. 1-21</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>open access</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/</dc:rights>
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