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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues Dutta, Bhaskar Massó, Jordi Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues Jocs, Teoria de Matching model Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590 Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044 In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution. 1997 Article https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143269 urn:10.1006/jeth.1997.2291 urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:143269 urn:articleid:10957235n75p464 urn:recercauab:ARE-4507 urn:scopus_id:0000132827 urn:wos_id:A1997XT95700009 urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/258a7fbf-dcf9-4310-82f1-44a1d7e6a115 eng Journal of economic theory ; Núm. 75 (1997), p. 464-475 open access Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets. https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ application/pdf