2026-04-17T22:16:11Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10256/93572024-06-14T09:48:40Zcom_2072_452955com_2072_2054col_2072_453065
RECERCAT
author
Artiga Galindo, Marc
2024-06-14T09:48:40Z
2024-06-14T09:48:40Z
2013-11
http://hdl.handle.net/10256/9357
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate
Tots els drets reservats info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Filosofia de la ment
Philosophy of mind
Representació (Filosofia)
Representation (Philosophy)
Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion