2026-04-17T22:16:17Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10256/93572024-06-14T09:48:40Zcom_2072_452955com_2072_2054col_2072_453065

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Artiga Galindo, Marc author 2013-11 Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate http://hdl.handle.net/10256/9357 Filosofia de la ment Philosophy of mind Representació (Filosofia) Representation (Philosophy) Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics